Monday

Monthly Archives: July 2023

Risk mitigation requires courage – How Cockcroft’s Folly saved 100s of lives!

One of the speakers at PGCS 2023 is Alex Walsh, his presentation Managing wicked program delivery looks at the UK nuclear program to decommission the Sellafield complex, one of the most complex high hazard nuclear facilities in the world that was operating from the 1940s through to 2022. For more on this presentation and the PGCS program see: https://www.pgcsymposium.org.au/.

As part of my work on preparing the PGCS program, I had a virtual look at this project and came across this fascinating risk mitigation story where the courage of two managers probably saved hundreds of lives in the North of England.

The site

Sellafield, formerly known as Windscale, is a large multi-function nuclear site close to Seascale on the coast of Cumbria, in NW England. As of August 2022, primary activities are nuclear waste processing and storage and nuclear decommissioning. Former activities included plutonium production for nuclear weapons, nuclear power generation from 1956 to 2003, and nuclear fuel reprocessing from 1952 to 2022.

After the war ended, the Special Relationship between Britain and the United States “became very much less special”. The British government saw this as a resurgence of United States isolationism which raised the possibility that Britain might have to fight an aggressor alone. It also feared that Britain might lose its great power status, and therefore its influence in world affairs, so in July 1946, the Chiefs of Staff Committee recommended that Britain acquire nuclear weapons.

Two reactors (called ‘piles’ at the time) were constructed to enrich uranium to create plutonium and other isotopes. The designers of these reactors desired a passively safe cooling system. In place of water, they used air cooling driven by convection through a 400-foot (120 m) tall chimney, which could create enough airflow to cool the reactor under normal operating conditions. The chimney was arranged so it pulled air through the channels in the reactor core, and huge fans were positioned in front of the core, to greatly increase the airflow rate.

The risk

During construction, physicist Terence Price considered the possibility of a fuel cartridge splitting open, causing the hot uranium to catch fire, resulting in fine uranium oxide dust being blown up the chimney and escaping into the environment.

Raising the issue at a meeting, he suggested filters be added to the chimneys, but his concerns were dismissed as too difficult and too expensive to deal with. However, Sir John Cockcroft, leading the project team, was sufficiently alarmed to order the filters.

They could not be installed at the base as construction of the chimneys had already begun, and were constructed on the ground then winched into position at the top once the chimneys were complete. They became known as Cockcroft’s Folly as many regarded the delay they caused and their great expense to be a needless waste.

This all changed after the Windscale fire of 10th October 1957. This fire was the worst nuclear accident in the United Kingdom’s history, and one of the worst in the world. The fire was in Unit 1 of the two-pile Windscale site and burned for three days releasing radioactive fallout which spread across the UK and the rest of Europe[1].

But, the filters trapped about 95% of the radioactive dust and arguably saved much of northern England from becoming a nuclear wasteland. With typical British understatement, Terence Price said “the word folly did not seem appropriate after the accident“.

The UK government under Harold Macmillan ordered original reports into the fire to be heavily censored and information about the incident to be kept largely secret. It later came to light that small but significant amounts of the highly dangerous radioactive isotope polonium-210 were released during the fire. But the presence of the chimney scrubbers at Windscale was credited with minimising the radioactive content of the smoke.

Both the ‘piles’ were shut down after the fire, but a large quantity of radioactive materials are still inside the sealed #1 pile; this is one of the challenges for the decommissioning program Alex will be speaking about at PGCS in a couple of weeks’ time.

More relevant to this post though is the moral courage exhibited by Sir John Cockcroft in doing the right thing rather than the easy thing to guard against an accident that ‘could not happen’, but did! Thinking through this dilemma puts a whole new perspective on risk assessment and mitigation – in the right circumstances ‘black swans’ can kill.

For more on risk management see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI-PBK-045.php


[1] For more on the fire see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windscale_fire

Predicting project outcomes is important!

The recent cancellation of the 2026 Commonwealth Games by the Victorian Government is a dramatic example of using predicted project outcomes to minimize damage to an organisation. The escalation in the predicted cost of delivery from $2.6 billion to above $6 billion suggests the original bid was wildly optimistic and discovering how such an error occurred should be worthy of enquiry, but that is not the focus of this post.

Once the predicted costs moved to a point where there was no benefit in continuing with the project, it was terminated. While the cancellation could have been done earlier and far more elegantly the fact remains cancelling the project was by far the best decision.

However, to be able to make this type of call, management need information they can rely on. Even then the decision is not simple.

Cost considerations

A decision to cancel a project has to balance: sunk costs, the cost to complete, the expected benefits, and the cost of not completing the project.  The three elements that matter are the cost to complete vs the benefits (sunk costs are lost either way), and the costs of not completing the project.

For more on sunk costs see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/Mag_Articles/P022_Sunk_Costs.pdf

Time considerations

Time is usually a secondary consideration but can be vital – the Commonwealth Games facilities would need to be open before the games start!  For more normal projects knowing the current projected completion date and the variance at completion are still important for two reasons.

First, the cost of time matters and needs to be included in the cost to complete estimate. Delayed completion may also impact benefits.

Second and more important, time issues tend to emerge as problem well before cost issues show up. A project that is losing time and is expected to finish late will almost inevitably show negative cost variances sooner or later.  Conversely, fixing the root cause of the time issues will often have a positive effect on the overall costs as well.

The problem is most projects do not run systems that are capable of producing a reliable prediction of the expected completion date. Our recent paper Calculating Completion looked at seven different methodologies for managing a project, only two gave reliable predictions of the completion date; these were Earned Schedule and Work Performance Management.

Earned Schedule (ES) was the best option, but implementing ES requires a significant investment in skills and systems. 

Work Performance Management (WPM) achieved similar results to ES without the overhead. All that is required to use the WPM spreadsheet is three bits of information.  To set up the WPM model the amount of work to be accomplished and the time allowed is needed, any metric can be used provided it is applied consistently. This baseline gives you the amount of work expected to be accomplished by a given date. The other bit of information is the actual amount of work achieved by the date.  From this data the predicted completion date is calculated.

The assumption built into WPM is that work will continue at the current rate. If the result is not acceptable, management needs to do something to change the rate of working. If this is not feasible, then the viability of the project needs to be considered and/or the baseline reset to what is achievable. For more on WPM see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI-SCH-041.php#Overview

Built to last

This is a cross section of a Roman Road some 1900 years after it was built. The Fosse Way linked Isca Dumnoniorum (Exeter) in the southwest of England and Lindum Colonia (Lincoln) to the northeast, via Lindinis (Ilchester), Aquae Sulis (Bath), Corinium (Cirencester), and Ratae Corieltauvorum (Leicester). Built in the first and second centuries, this cross section excavated in the early 1900s demonstrates the standard road building techniques of the time. The surface ruts show the road was heavily trafficked for an extended period*, and the road was clearly built to last. 

Compared to many modern road construction techniques that seem to need continuous maintenance was the high level of initial investment repaid by well over a millennium of use? The concepts of good substrata, good drainage and a long-lasting wearing course are the same today as in Roman times, so why are we building roads designed to fail? Are the cost horizons too short??

A similar concept is Roman cement. The Roman recipe, a mix of volcanic ash, lime (calcium oxide), seawater and lumps of volcanic rock, held together piers, breakwaters and harbours (as well as structures such as the Pantheon) for centuries. In contrast to modern materials, these ancient structures became stronger over time. 

The chemical processes involved in the cement are known[1], and what we consider corrosion processes can produce extremely beneficial mineral cement and lead to continued resilience over time. The study of Roman cement offers clues for a concrete recipe that does not rely on the high temperatures and carbon dioxide production of modern cement, while providing a blueprint for a durable construction material, particularly for use in marine environments.

Everyone is talking about ESG and we are seeing ‘green buildings’ with bits of timber bolted onto the exterior to get a ‘green star’ – with a life span of 50 years if you are lucky…… 

The 30-year old timber facade at Melbourne Central.

Is it time to start thinking about long term durability and building for 500 to 1000 years with a view to repurposing rather than recycling?

For more on Green Building see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI-TPI-005.php#GB

* Note: Despite this photograph proving Roman roads developed cartwheel ruts, there is no support for the common myth that these ruts are linked to the creation of standard guage railways (correlation is not causation!), see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/Mag_Articles/AA016_The_Origins_of_Standard_Gauge_Railways.pdf


[1] See: Jackson, Marie D., Mulcahy, Sean R., Chen, Heng, Li, Yao, Li, Qinfei, Cappelletti, Piergiulio and Wenk, Hans-Rudolf. “Phillipsite and Al-tobermorite mineral cements produced through low-temperature water-rock reactions in Roman marine concrete” American Mineralogist, vol. 102, no. 7, 2017, pp. 1435-1450. https://doi.org/10.2138/am-2017-5993CCBY

The First Canals

Canal construction is an interesting branch of both engineering and project management:

  • From the engineering perspective, planning a route that works (water flows in the right direction at the right speed), retaining the water within the canal, and overcoming natural obstacles indicates the need for a degree of design sophistication.
  • From a management perspective organising the 100s, or 1000s of people needed for the work and ensuring the work is done correctly is a significant exercise in organisation, logistics and control. As with most early projects, there’s scant information on how this was accomplished, but the results are self-evident.

Canals have been excavated and used for drainage and irrigation for thousands of years. But for most of this time, the use of canals was restricted to relatively flat areas with good water supply. It was the advances in technology in the Middle Ages that allowed canals and navigations to overcome the problem of hills, resulting in canals becoming a major form of transport. The First Canals is the final paper in a series looking at early transport projects.

The full set of papers in this series are:

The First Canals. This article looks at the early development of canals across the world from 4000 BCE through to the European medieval canal revival between the 12th and 16th centuries.

Early Canals, The Evolution of the Technology. Canals have been excavated for drainage and irrigation for thousands of years and once built, the larger of the canals were undoubtedly used for trade. However, for several thousand years canals were restricted to areas where the land was relatively flat. This article looks at the development of the technologies that allowed canals to traverse hills and valleys.

Early Canal Projects in the UK. Until the introduction of efficient steam-powered railways, canals were the driving force behind the industrial revolution in Britain.  This paper looks at the development of canals in the UK from Roman times through to the start of the ‘canal mania’ in the 1790s, and seek to identify where possible the contractual and management processes used in their construction.

Cost Overruns on Early Canal & Railway Projects. The difficulties in determining a realistic cost for a new class of project are understandable. But, transport projects in the United Kingdom (UK) predate the industrial revolution by several centuries. This suggests that in addition to the lack of empirical cost information, the problem with the cost estimates identified in The Origins and History of Cost Engineering may have been caused by various combinations of poor governance, questionable ethics, and optimism bias. The same set of issues that continue to plague many modern mega-projects.

A similar set of papers look at the development of the railways (see more).

See more on early transport projects at: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI-ZSY-005.php#Process2

Calculating a Completion Date is Subjective.

Calculating a projected project completion date is subjective! Depending on the tools used for assessing the status, and predicting the completion, of this simple project the assessment can vary from:

  • We don’t really know,
  • The work is currently behind schedule but we are not sure by how much,
  • The work is 5 weeks, 1 month, or 3 weeks late, or
  • The project completion is expected to be either 3 weeks, 1 month or 4 months late!

The answer depends on the tool you are using, and the way it is used.

Our latest paper, Calculating Completion, uses the simple project shown above to assess the subjective and objective information available from: Bar Charts, Burndown Charts, Kanban Boards, Velocity, CPM, EVM + ES, and Work Performance Management (WPM). It explains the way the results are derived by each of the tools and the options open to users to vary the result.

The challenge for project controls experts, is all of the answers above can be realistically extracted from one or more of these tools! Deciding which option is correct is an altogether more complex question, there probably is no single correct answer!

To read more on this challenge, download Calculating Completion, from:  https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PDF_Papers/P217_Calculating_Completion.pdf

For more on Project Controls see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI-SCH-005.php

The 19th century Spanish Prisoner Swindle!

Every improvement in technology leads to a new way of parting people from their money, and it appears gullible victims can still be found after at least 150 years of swindling.

One of the first technological advances that allowed direct communication to individuals occurred in the 19th century.  In the 1840s Britain introduced a pre-paid national postal service and the ‘Penny Black’ postage stamp, you could post a letter to anyone and expect it to be delivered. Shortly thereafter, this new service was being used to scam unsuspecting victims, and as similar postal services were established in other countries, the scam spread.

The ‘Spanish Prisoner’, as the name suggest, was operated by criminals based in Spain. Using trade directories to obtain names and addresses of people, they sent out hundreds of letters across Britain spinning a tale of a person held in a Spanish prison. In other parts of the world, similarly close, but difficult to access places became the location of the ‘prison’. 

Generally, the story was that a former military officer was being held prisoner in a Spanish prison. He wrote that his father or grandfather was English, but he had entered the military of service of Spain and had been wrongly accused of stealing money. He was now seriously ill and was in fear of death.

He would announce that he had a daughter who needed looking after and in his Will had appointed the recipient of the letter to be his daughter’s guardian. Furthermore, he had a large sum of money hidden away which needed to be recovered from a secret location. Once the victim responded sympathetically to what they thought was a sincere and truthful story, money would be requested to pay for the daughter’s travel expenses, etc. All totally fictitious of course.

As with modern scams, there is no doubt that victims were found. There are numerous newspaper articles starting around 1876 which refer to the fraud and how victims had been taken in, and the occasional article detailing a successful police response.  

It appears some things never change:

–  Developers of new technologies rarely think about potential abuses

–  Criminals are always early adopters

–  People get caught out.

This post is outside of our normal range focused on the history of projects and allied disciplines but this subject does raise questions around the ethical responsibility of people developing new processes and technologies. For more on the evolution of ethics see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI-ZSY-015.php 

DCMA 14 Point Schedule Assessment – Updated

There seems to be a lot of misunderstanding around the intention and use of the DCMA 14 Point Schedule Assessment.  Following on from several discussions over the last month or so we have updated our White Paper: DCMA 14-Point Assessment Metrics and uploaded the last published version of the Metrics:  Earned Value Management System (EVMS) Program Analysis Pamphlet (PAP), DCMA-EA PAM 200.1, October 2012.

The EVMS-PAP is designed for use in performing an integrated baseline review of a major program using EVM, but EVM relies on a competent schedule and Section 4 of DCMA-EA PAM 200.1 defines the last published version of the DCMA 14 Point Schedule Metrics. As can be seen from the date of publication, the DCMA 14 Points are quite old, and they did change in the years before 2012 (for more on the evolution of the DCMA 14 Points see: The evolution of the DCMA 14 Point Schedule Assessment). This leads to two significant problems:

The first is many people misunderstand the objective of the assessment. The objective is stated explicitly in the document:

The DCMA 14 Point Schedule Metrics were developed to identify potential problem areas with a contractor’s IMS…… These metrics provide the analyst with a framework for asking educated questions and performing follow-up research. The identification of a “red” metric is not in and of itself synonymous with failure but rather an indicator or a catalyst to dig deeper in the analysis for understanding the reason for the situation. Consequently, correction of that metric is not necessarily required, but it should be understood.

Earlier versions talked about pass/fail, this concept has been dropped (and was never a good idea).

The second issue is implementation of the assessment. The implementation of the DCMA 14-Point Assessment in the various software tools is not certified by the DCMA or any other body and varies between the tools!  The biggest issue is around counting of the number of tasks to be considered. The 2012 version stated that the Total Tasks should exclude: Completed tasks, LOE tasks, Subprojects (called Summary tasks in MS Project), and Milestones (Zero Duration Tasks). This differs from the 2009 update, and the 2009 update changed from earlier versions.

There is an established correlation between a competently prepared schedule and project success – successful projects tend to have an effective controls system and a ‘good’ schedule, but the key measure of a good schedule is it is useful and is used. The purpose of the DCMA checks is to identify issues that need to be understood.

For more on schedule quality see: https://mosaicprojects.com.au/PMKI-SCH-020.php#Overview